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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of financial restatements on the sell-side
analysts’ stock recommendations.
Design/methodology/approach – The sample of this study is based on a dataset from a panel of 246
Malaysian public listed companies for the period 2008 to 2013 (651 company-year observations). This study
employs feasible generalized least squares regression.
Findings – This study finds a negative and significant relationship between restated companies and sell-side
analysts’ stock recommendations, whichmeans that sell-side analysts issue less favorable stock recommendations
for restated companies.
Practical implications – The findings based on observations from an emerging economy complement the
results of the US studies that analysts revise their earnings forecasts or recommendations downwards or drop
coverage following financial restatements. The results of this study should be useful to capital market
participants in understanding how analysts perceive and evaluate restated companies.
Originality/value –This paper expands the literature on financial restatements consequences in an emerging
market which is largely unstudied. Prior research on analyst behavior towards restatements has focused on the
consequences of restatements in terms of analyst following and forecast accuracy and dispersion. This study
examines if and how the restatements affect the analysts’ final output as reflected in the recommendation
opinion, an area that has so far received little attention.
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Over the last two decades, financial restatements have become a very important issue and are
of concern among capital market participants, regulators and academics (Desai et al., 2006;
Archambeault et al., 2008; Chen Ken et al., 2014; Dao et al., 2014; Du, 2017; Street and
Hermanson, 2019). Accounting restatements by companies indicate that their previously
issued financial statements may be incomplete or unreliable, which may lead users of the
misleading financial reports to make incorrect decisions (Flanagan et al., 2008). There is
ample empirical evidence on the adverse consequences of financial misreporting, such as
discounted market valuation, lower (higher) analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy
(dispersion) (Palmrose et al., 2004), decline in the value relevance of accounting information
(Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Wilson, 2008), decrease in the amount of net cash provided by
financing activities (John et al., 2015), increase in the cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins,
2004), larger bid-ask spreads (Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004), credit ratings
downgrade (Bierey and Schmidt, 2017) and loss of board seats (Street and Hermanson, 2019).
Wilson (2008) argues that restatements raise concerns with the market’s assessment
of the quality of reported financial information. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
financial analysts, highly trained specialists who act as key information intermediaries in
capital markets by analyzing, interpreting and disseminating corporate information
for non-professional and unsophisticated investors, react adversely in the wake of
restatements. A recent example of the immediate impact of financial restatements is
Toshiba Corp., which announced in 2015 the likely restatements of its earnings for fiscal
years 2011 through 2013. In the wake of the restatements, its stock price dropped by 17%
and seven analysts stopped following and rating the company. In this regard, Takeo
Miyamoto, an analyst at Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley, remarked, “This raises questions
about the reliability of the financial figures on which our earnings estimates are based”
(Alpeyev and Amano, 2015).
According to Griffin (2003), the attention of academic researchers to the behavior of
financial analysts toward irregular events, such as financial restatements, is limited. A few
studies in the developed economies show that the number of analysts covering these
companies declines in the period after restatements, and analysts are more likely to revise
their earnings forecast downward following financial restatements (Griffin, 2003; Palmrose
et al., 2004; Kryzanowski and Zhang, 2013). Ye and Yu (2017) find a reduction in analyst
coverage and forecast accuracy and an increase in forecast dispersion for restated companies
in the post-restatement period. However, Jiang et al. (2015) assert that studies on the
consequences of financial restatements in emerging markets are scarce, even though these
emerging markets are more vulnerable to financial reporting manipulation and subsequent
financial restatements. To bridge this gap in the literature, this study aims to shed more light
on the influence of financial restatements on the nature of sell-side analysts’ [1]stock
recommendations (buy/hold/sell). Graham et al. (2005) assert that executives rate analysts’
recommendations and forecasts as one of the most influential factors impacting their firms’
stock prices. Despite the key role played by financial analysts in accumulating and
synthesizing information frommanagement and other sources to capital market participants
(Newton, 2018), little is known about how they react to accounting restatements in issuing
opinion on stock recommendations, especially in emerging markets.
Malaysia provides a useful setting to examine the research question for several reasons.
First, financial restatements are quite pervasive, as evidenced byQasem et al. (2017), who find
that more than 20% of Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs) restated their financial
statements during the period 2005 to 2014. This issue has attracted the attention of
researchers to examine the reasons for and determinants of financial restatements (Abdullah
et al., 2010; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014; Hasnan and Hussain, 2015; Wan Mohammad et al.,




2011) in Malaysia. However, studies examining the consequences of financial restatements in
Malaysia and emerging markets are virtually non-existent. Second, the analyst reports are
publicly available on the Bursa Malaysia website for Malaysian companies that participated
in the exchange-sponsored research scheme (see section 3.1 for details), which provides an
excellent opportunity for scholars to study analysts’ reactions to restatements.
The study employs a dataset from a panel of 246 Malaysian PLCs for the period 2008 to
2013 (651 company-year observations). The results show a negative and significant
relationship between restated companies and the sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations,
which means that sell-side analysts issue less favorable stock recommendations for
restated companies. Additional tests show that the negative recommendations are driven
by irregularities and misrepresentation/reclassification types of restatement (but not
misapplication of accounting rules).
The study makes the following contributions. While most studies on analyst behavior
toward restatements focus on the consequences of restatements in terms of analyst following
and forecast accuracy and dispersion (Griffin, 2003; Ye and Yu, 2017; Alfonso et al., 2018), our
study contributes to the literature by examining if and how the restatements affect the
analysts’ final output as reflected in the nature of the recommendation opinion, an area that
has so far received little attention. As a matter of fact, most existing studies on the
determinants of analysts’ buy/hold/sell recommendations have only considered various
firm-specific factors, such as strength of corporate governance (Yu, 2011), corporate social
responsibility initiatives (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015), earnings growth and risk (Peasnell
et al., 2018), shareholder rights (Autore et al., 2009), equity incentive plans (Liu, 2017) and
degree of internationalization (Luo and Zheng, 2018). However, to date, none has explored
whether or not accounting restatements influence analysts’ stock recommendations, with the
exception of Young and Peng (2013). We also add to the literature of analyst behavior in
emerging markets as there is a dearth of studies in this area. While most previous studies
have been conducted in developed economies, this study provides evidence from emerging
markets which is not yet well researched. The results of this study should be useful to
investors, management and capital market regulators to understand how analysts perceive
and evaluate restated companies.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review and
hypothesis development; Section 3 discusses the sample and researchmethods; and Section 4
provides the empirical results. Sections 5 and 6 offer the robustness tests and the conclusion,
respectively.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
The signaling theory is appropriate to describe the behavior of two parties (organizations or
individuals) when they are able to access different information (Connelly et al., 2011).
In particular, this theory emphasizes how some actions of companies may influence the
behavior of a different type of stakeholder, such as financial analysts (Zmud et al., 2010).
Financial restatements send bad signals about the credibility of companies’ financial
reporting and cause reputation damage and negative industry valuation effects (Akhigbe and
Madura, 2008; Gomulya and Boeker, 2014).
Financial restatements prompt questions about the reliability of a company’s financial
reporting process, especially restatements arising from non-compliance with the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), where the original financial statements were
incorrect at the time of issue (Hennes et al., 2008). Many studies document the adverse
economic consequences of financial restatements (Dao et al., 2014; Xu and Zhao, 2016). These
consequences include negative market reactions toward restating companies (Anderson and






Chen Ken et al., 2014; Du, 2017) and increased cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins, 2004;
Firth et al., 2011; Bardos and Mishra, 2014). Financial restatements also contribute to higher
audit fees (Feldmann et al., 2009), higher dependency on the revised forecasts of financial
analysts (Barniv and Cao, 2009), increased litigation risk (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004) and
higher manager and director turnover for restating companies (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006;
Desai et al., 2006; Burks, 2010; Dao et al., 2014; Xu and Zhao, 2016; Street and Hermanson,
2019). Street and Hermanson (2019) review prior studies specifically related to the
consequences that outside directors and boards may face in the aftermath of earnings
restatements. They conclude that restatements provide a signal which suggests the
poor quality of outside directors’ monitoring of the financial reporting process, which
consequently leads to loss of board seats, partly caused by adverse proxy advisor
recommendations and reduced shareholder support. However, their review is predominantly
focused on US studies.
Another stream of research examines the governance role of financial analysts in
identifying corporate fraud and in limiting earnings management (Yu, 2008; Chen et al., 2015;
Irani and Oesch, 2016), and analysts’ reactions to restatements (Griffin, 2003; Palmrose et al.,
2004; Ye and Yu, 2017) and corporate social responsibility engagements (Hinze and Sump,
2019). Based on all reported fraud cases in large US companies, Dyck et al. (2010) document
the role of financial analysts as whistle blowers, as they are often the first to detect corporate
fraud. Financial analysts also demonstrate concern with the consequences of financial
restatements, claiming that restatements damage the quality of financial reports (Wilson,
2008). Griffin (2003) examines the response of financial analysts to US companies’
restatements and concludes that the number of sell-side analysts covering a company
decline significantly in themonths following financial restatements. The study also finds that
sell-side analysts revise their earnings forecasts downwards for a month to six months
following disclosure of financial restatements. Palmrose et al. (2004) document an average
abnormal return of about -9% over a two-day restatement announcement window, and
more negative returns are found when the restatements involve fraud, affect multiple
accounts, are initiated by auditors or management and decrease reported income. Based on
Canadian markets, Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013) find evidence consistent with the US
finding in terms of downward revisions in consensus earnings forecast after restatement
announcements.
Using detailed data from the US SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAER), Young and Peng (2013) conclude that financial analysts are more likely to take
severe action and drop coverage than simply revise their stock recommendations downwards
for companies with accounting fraud. Using a sample of US restatement companies, Ye and
Yu (2017) find that analysts react differently according to the severity of restatements based
on Hennes et al.’s (2008) classification. They document that restatement companies exhibit a
reduction in analyst coverage but the reduction in analyst following does not vary with
the severity of restatements (irregularities, i.e. intentional misstatements versus other
restatements, i.e. unintentional errors), irregularities restatement companies exhibit higher
analyst earnings forecasts dispersion following restatements, but not other restatement
companies, and both irregularities and errors restatement companies have higher analyst
forecast errors post-restatements.
The previous Malaysian studies related to restatements do not focus extensively on the
consequences of restatements. Instead, the emphasis is more on factors associated with the
likelihood of accounting misstatements, such as corporate governance characteristics,
including board, auditor and ownership structure (Abdullah et al., 2010; Abdul Wahab et al.,
2014; Aziz et al., 2017; Hasnan et al., 2017; Wan Mohammad et al., 2018). Studies on financial
analysts and analyst reports in Malaysia are also limited (Saadouni and Simon, 2004; Foo,




Moreover, none of the studies specifically examines the association between restatements
and analyst behavior. Thus, our study narrows the literature gap in this neglected area.
Based on the above discussion, the natural question to ask is whether or not the weakness
in the quality of corporate financial reporting as indicated by financial restatements may
influence sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. Given that prior evidence suggests that
restatements to correct previous misinformation, misrepresentation and non-GAAP
accounting, signal a discredited and incompetent management team (Hribar and Jenkins,
2004) and flawed board monitoring of management (Street and Hermanson, 2019), this study
predicts that sell-side analysts will be pessimistic and issue adverse stock recommendations
for companies that issue restated financial statements. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) argue that
restatements increase information uncertainty and risk and cause investors to require a
higher rate of returns. Thus, the following hypothesis is stated:
H1. Sell-side analysts issue less positive stock recommendations for restated companies.
3. Data and research methods
3.1 Data and sample
The population for this study is the Malaysian PLCs that participated in the Bursa Malaysia
Capital Market Development Fund (CMDF) – Bursa Research Scheme (CBRS) from 2008 to
2013. Bursa Malaysia launched the CBRS scheme in 2005, with the main aim of generating
research coverage for the Malaysian PLCs and providing investors with more information to
help them make informed investment decisions (Qasem et al., 2015). For the purpose of this
study, selected companies must have at least one analyst’s stock recommendation between
one to six months after the issuance of the company’s annual report. Accordingly, a total of
246 companies (651 company-year observations) are included in this study. A summary of the
sample selection criteria and distribution by sector is presented in Table 1.
According to Hasnan and Hussain (2015), a list of the restated companies is not available
from Bursa Malaysia. Malaysian companies are not required to make an immediate
announcement once they realize that prior financial statements have to be restated, unlike
other significant events, such as issuance of modified audit opinion, loan default, financial
Panel A: Sample selection
Explanation Company-Year Observations
CBRS analysts’ reports from 2008 to 2013 1,048
Less
Analysts’ reports related to financial companies 35
Analysts’ reports issued less than one month or more than six
months after the annual reports
273
Analysts’ reports with missing data 89
Analysts’ reports available for analysis 651
Panel B: Sector classification
Sector Company-Year Observations Percentage
Trading/Services 185 28.42
Industrial Products 178 27.34














distress, winding-up, change in external auditor, material litigation and any deviation of 10%
or more between the audited earnings and forecast earnings, or between announced
unaudited financial statements and the audited financial statements, and give an explanation
of the deviation as gazetted in the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements, chapter 9 (Bursa
Malaysia, 2019). Analysts or other users of financial statements are made aware of the
restatements to the previously issued financial statements only when they see the
comparative financial statements in the following year. However, in exceptional cases,
when the regulators impose sanctions by forcing the company to rectify and reissue its
audited financial statements for knowingly authorizing the furnishing of false or misleading
statements, immediate announcements are required. A case in point is the announcement
made by YFG Berhad on May 14, 2015 regarding the directive from the Securities
Commission issued on 13 May 2015 for the company to reissue the audited financial
statement for financial year ended June 30, 2014.
In order to identify restated companies among our sample, we search the annual reports of
the sample companies for keywords, such as “restatement,” “restate,” “restated” or “prior
year adjustments,” following prior Malaysian studies (Abdullah et al., 2010; Abdul Wahab
et al., 2014; Hasnan andHussain, 2015;WanMohammad et al., 2018). The data for this study is
obtained from Bursa Malaysia website (CBRS research reports and annual reports) and
DataStream.
3.2 Measurement of variables
3.2.1 Stock recommendation.We use the mean of CBRS analysts’ recommendations for each
company between one to six months after the issuance of the company’s annual report as the
dependent variable (REC) for our empirical specification. CBRS research analysts issue three
types of stock recommendations: buy, hold or sell. For the purpose of this study, the analysts’
stock recommendations (REC) variable is coded 1 if the recommendation is unfavorable
(“sell”), 2 if it is neutral (“hold”) and 3 if it is favorable (“buy”) (Barber et al., 2006; Arand and
Kerl, 2015). Therefore, for a given company in the focal year, we first collect all CBRS
analysts’ recommendations between one to six months after the issuance of the company’s
annual report; then, we calculate the mean of these recommendations. We also collect the last
recommendation issued prior to the release of the annual reports for additional testing.
3.2.2 Financial restatements. The main explanatory variable in this study is financial
restatements. This study includes financial restatements occurrence as a result of financial
fraud, irregularities and errors that come from mathematical mistakes, misrepresentations/
reclassifications and misapplication of accounting rules[2]. Restatements attributable to
changes in accounting policies are excluded (Paterson and Valencia, 2011; Wang and Wu,
2011; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014). Financial restatements are measured as a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if the company issues financial restatements, and 0 otherwise. Following
previous studies (Paterson and Valencia, 2011; Abdul Wahab et al., 2014), we also classify
financial restatements asmisapplication of accounting rules (Restate_AR),misrepresentation
(Restate_M) and irregularities (Restate_I), based on the review of the annual reports.
Examples of the three types of restatement are provided in Appendix A.
3.2.3 Control variables. In line with previous studies on analysts’ outputs (Jegadeesh et al.,
2004; Autore et al., 2009; Han et al., 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Liu, 2016, 2017), this
study includes several control variables, namely board size (BSIZE), board independence
(BINDP), CEO duality (DUAL), managerial ownership (MOWN), company size (LNSIZE),
leverage (LEVGE), Altman Z-Score (Z-Score), earnings to price ratio (EP), company
profitability (ROE), share price return (RETURN) and political connection (POCN).
The rationales for their inclusion are provided below.
Some corporate governance studies argue that smaller boards are viewed as more




(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). In contrast, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue that large boards
can provide companies with a diversity of contacts, experience and expertise needed to
improve performance. Accordingly, this study predicts the non-directional effect of board size
on sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. Byard et al. (2006) find a significant and
positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and the accuracy of
analysts’ earnings forecasts. As such, this study expects a positive relationship between
board independence and analysts’ stock recommendations.
Duality indicates the situation where one person serves as both Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) and chairman of the board in a particular company. A company with CEO duality
signals to stakeholders that it is under an efficient and powerful leader who has an
unambiguous sense of direction. Previous studies find a positive relationship between CEO
duality and company performance and the amount of capital raised (Badru et al., 2017;
Hassoun and Aloui, 2017). Therefore, this study proposes that companies with CEO duality
receive favorable stock recommendations.
Han et al. (2014) and Liu (2016) find a positive relationship between the precision of
sell-side analysts’ earnings forecasts and managerial ownership, consistent with the
alignment view of managerial ownership. This study therefore predicts the positive effect of
managerial ownership on sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations. Ioannou and Serafeim
(2015) claim that financial analysts may issue optimistic recommendations for larger
companies because trading in these companies generates more commission and investment
banking business. This study follows Han et al. (2014) who control for leverage in modeling
analyst stock recommendations. They find that the precision of financial analysts’
information is negatively related to leverage. Likewise, we predict high leverage is
associated with less positive stock recommendations in this study. Ioannou and Serafeim
(2015), Autore et al. (2009) and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) also find that sell-side analysts issue
more favorable stock recommendations for companies with higher earnings to price ratio,
which reflects the contrarian effects. Clarke et al. (2006) find that financial analysts revise
their stock recommendations downward as bankruptcy approaches; they useAltman Z-Score
to measure bankruptcy. In addition, Young and Peng (2013) also show that firms with high
Z-Score, indicating less likelihood of financial distress, are less likely to have adverse analyst
coverage reactions. Thus, we expect Z-Score to be associated with positive analysts’ output in
our study.
Return on equity is a general measure of a firm’s profitability, and has been used as a
control variable in previous studies related to stock recommendations (Gu et al., 2013).
Previous studies find that companies with higher and better-performing stocks receive more
positive stock recommendations (Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). Finally,
this study controls for the politically connected companies. According to Faccio (2006), nearly
one-third of the Malaysian listed companies are known to be politically connected. How et al.
(2014) claim that there is greater information asymmetry between the politically linked
companies and the participants in the financial market, such as financial analysts in
Malaysia. Hence, this study expects a negative relationship between politically connected
companies and sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations, due to the opaque information
environment.
3.3 Statistical method
This study uses panel data to examine the influence of the financial restatements on sell-side
analysts’ stock recommendations. In panel data, even if the variance of errors is constant
between cross-sectional observations, the variance may differ within observations through
time, which raises the issue of group-wise heteroscedasticity (Baum, 2001). In order to check
heteroscedasticity in our model, we use the Modified Wald test for group-wise






of heteroscedasticity and needs to be corrected. Further, to test for the existence of
autocorrelation, we use Wooldridge’s (2002: 282–283) test for panel data. The result of
Wooldridge’s test indicates that the problem of autocorrelation is insignificant. Therefore, we
adopt feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) for panel data with panel-specific
heteroscedasticity error structure to test our hypothesis (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010;
Cai et al., 2012; Luo et al., 2013; Buckley et al., 2014; Sakawa and Watanabel, 2018). The
advantages of FGLS over ordinary least squares (OLS) is that FGLS provides more reliable
estimates and unbiased standard errors in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge,
2002; Petersen, 2009; Baltagi, 2011). This study also includes industry and year dummies to
capture variations over time and across industries. This study uses the following model to
test the study’s main hypothesis.
RECit ¼β0 þ β1RESTATEit þ β2BSIZEit þ β3BINDPit þ β4DUALit
þ β5MOWNit þ β6LNSIZEit þ β7LEVGEit
þ β8Z-Scoreit þ β9EPit þ β10ROEit þ β11RETURNit þ β12POCNit
þ Year dummiesþ Sector dummiesþ εit
where,
REC 5 The mean of CBRS sell-side analysts’ recommendations
RESTATE 5 Occurrence of financial restatements
BSIZE 5 Board size
BINDP 5 Board independence
DUAL 5 Board Chair-CEO duality
MOWN 5 Managerial ownership
LNSIZE 5 Natural log of market capitalization
LEVGE 5 Total debt to total assets ratio
Z-Score 5 Altman Z-Score
EP 5 Earnings to price ratio
ROE 5 Return on equity ratio
RETURN 5 Share price return
POCN 5 Politically connected firm.
The measurement of the variables above is provided in Table 2 below.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 and Figure 1 present financial restatements during the study period. There are 158
restatements (24.27% of total observations), with more occurrences in the earlier sample
period than the later period. For example, there are 56 restatements (35.44%) in 2008,
compared to 10 (6.33%) in 2013. One possible reason for the higher restatements in the earlier
period is the side effects of the 2008–2009 global economic crisis. Even though the crisis badly
hit the US and several developed countries, the Malaysian economy also experienced the




Table 4 shows the distribution of types of financial restatements based on a review of the
annual reports. As shown in Table 4, financial restatements arising from misapplication of
accounting rules (Restate_AR) represent 33.54% (53) of total financial restatements across





REC Indicates the mean of CBRS analysts’ stock recommendations. Higher




RESTATE Dummy variable coded 1 when company restates the financial
statements, and 0 otherwise
Restate_AR Dummy variable coded 1 when restatement is due to misapplication of
accounting rules, and 0 otherwise
Restate_I
Restate_Mis
Dummy variable coded 1 when restatement is due to accounting
irregularities, and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable coded 1 when restatement is due to
misrepresentations/reclassifications, and 0 otherwise
CEO Duality DUAL Dummy variable coded 1 when the position of chairman and CEO are
held by the same person, and 0 otherwise
Managerial
ownership
MOWN The percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors
Company size LNSIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization
Leverage LEVGE The ratio of total debt to total assets
Altman Z-Score Z-Score Indicates Altman’s (1993) Z-scorea as a proxy for financial distress
Earnings to price
ratio
EP Earnings per share divided by stock price
Return on equity ROE The return on equity
Share price return RETURN The total return index at the fiscal year end for period t minus total
return index at the fiscal year end for period t-1 to total return index at
the fiscal year end for period t-1
Politically
connected
POCN Dummy variable coded 1 when the company is politically connected
and 0 otherwiseb
Note(s): aZ-score5 1.2 (Working capital/Total assets)þ 1.4 (Retained earnings/Total assets)þ 3.3 (Earnings
before interest and taxes/Total assets)þ 0.6 (Market value of equity/Book value of liabilities)þ 1.0 (Sales/Total
assets) (Altman, 1993)
bFung et al. (2015) defined POCN as satisfying any of the following criteria: (a) had government cabinet
members and/or MPs as members of the board, or (b) had significant ownership by government or UMNO-
linked organizations/individuals, or (c) had politically connected individuals as their managers. Similarly, a
politically connected company is identified using the procedure in prior studies (Holland and Johanson, 2003;
Faccio, 2006; Fung et al., 2015; Tee et al., 2017; Wong and Hooy, 2018)
Financial restatements 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Restatements N 56 31 22 18 21 10 158
% Yearly 35.44 19.62 13.92 11.39 13.29 6.33 100
% Occurrence 30.94 22.14 25 21.43 20.59 17.86 24.27
Non-Restatements N 125 109 66 66 81 46 493
% Yearly 25.35 22.11 13.39 13.39 16.43 9.33 100
% Occurrence 69.06 77.86 75 78.57 79.41 82.14 75.73
Total N 181 140 88 84 102 56 651











11.39% (18) and restatements due to misrepresentations/reclassifications (Restate_Mis)
account for 55.06% (87). The results show that most of the restatements occur due to
misrepresentations/reclassifications, consistent with the results of previous Malaysian
studies (Abdul Wahab et al., 2014).
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables in this study. The mean of
stock recommendations (REC) is 2.32, suggesting there are more analyst reports with
favorable recommendations (hold or buy) than unfavorable ones (sell). With regards to the
control variables, Table 5 shows that the average board size is 7.85, the mean score of board
independence (BINDP) is 44%, the mean score for CEO duality (DUAL) is 0.16, meaning that
around 104 out of the 651 observations have CEO duality, and the average of direct
managerial ownership (MOWN) is 10% with a maximum of 71% and minimum of zero.
Regarding company size, which is proxied by market capitalization (SIZE), there is
considerable variation, ranging from RM8.7 million to RM56.1 billion, with a mean of RM1.9
billion. This mean is comparable to the result of How et al. (2014), who obtained RM2.4 billion.
In addition, the sample companies have an average of debt to assets ratio of 19%, and the
mean of Z-Score is 3.87 with a maximum of 39.12 and minimum of 2.29, consistent with
previous Malaysian studies (Wan-Hussin and Bamahros, 2013). The average earnings to
price ratio (EP) is 0.10. The results also show that the sample companies are profitable with an
average ROE of 11%. The mean of return on share price is 0.09. Nearly 36% of sample











2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Restatements Non-Restatements
Types of restatements 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Misapplication of accounting rules
(Restate_AR)
N 24 9 5 7 4 4 53
%
Yearly
45.28 16.98 9.43 13.21 7.55 7.55 100
% Type 42.86 29.03 22.73 38.89 19.05 40 33.54
Irregularities (Restate_I) N 4 3 4 1 4 2 18
%
Yearly
22.22 16.67 22.22 5.56 22.22 11.11 100
% Type 7.14 9.68 18.18 5.56 19.05 20 11.39
Misrepresentation (Restate_Mis) N 28 19 13 10 13 4 87
%
Yearly
32.18 21.84 14.94 11.49 14.94 4.6 100
% Type 50 61.29 59.09 55.56 61.9 40 55.06
Total N 56 31 22 18 21 10 158
%
Yearly











Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
REC 2.320 2.333 0.603 1.000 3.000
RESTATE 0.243 0.000 0.429 0.000 1.000
BSIZE 7.851 8.000 1.864 4.000 14.000
BINDP 0.448 0.429 0.121 0.250 1.000
DUAL 0.161 0.000 0.368 0.000 1.000
MOWN (%) 10.038 2.851 14.770 0.000 71.150
SIZE (RM 000) 1,916,241 257,186 6,276,328 8,690 56,100,000
LNSIZE 12.661 12.458 1.671 9.070 17.842
LEVGE (%) 19.088 18.250 15.377 0.000 61.780
Z-Score 3.874 2.872 4.102 2.294 39.117
EP 0.099 0.098 0.180 2.320 1.212
ROE (%) 11.069 10.930 12.304 54.680 93.120
RETURN 0.094 0.053 0.407 0.908 2.926
POCN 0.364 0.000 0.482 0.000 1.000
Note(s): REC 5 The mean of CBRS sell-side analysts’ recommendations, where Sell 5 1, Hold 5 2 and
Buy5 3; RESTATE5 Coded 1 if company restates financial statements, and 0 otherwise; BSIZE5 The total
number of the directors on the board; BINDP 5 The percentage of independent directors; DUAL 5 Coded 1
when the position of chairman and CEO are held by the same person, and 0 otherwise; MOWN 5 The
percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors; SIZE 5 Market capitalization;
LNSIZE 5 Natural logarithm of market capitalization; LEVGE 5 The ratio of total debt to total assets;
Z-Score5Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a proxy for financial distress; EP5 Earnings per share divided by stock
price for the company; ROE5 Return on equity; RETURN5 The total return index at the fiscal year end for
period tminus total return index at the fiscal year end for periodt-1 to total return index at the fiscal year end for
periodt-1; POCN5 Coded 1 when the company is politically connected, and 0 otherwise. Number of firms5 651
Restated (n 5 158) Non-restated (n 5 493) t-test
REC 2.318 2.320 0.045
BSIZE 8.108 7.769 1.993**
BINDP (%) 0.441 0.451 0.868
DUAL 0.165 0.160 0.128
MOWN (%) 9.736 10.135 0.296
LNSIZE 12.624 12.673 0.322
LEVGE (%) 19.852 18.843 0.718
Z-Score 3.299 4.058 2.029**
EP 0.113 0.094 1.147
ROE (%) 12.070 10.749 1.174
RETURN 0.071 0.101 0.811
POCN 0.348 0.369 0.478
Note(s): REC 5 The mean of CBRS sell-side analysts’ recommendations, where Sell 5 1, Hold 5 2 and
Buy5 3; RESTATE5 Coded 1 if company restates financial statements, and 0 otherwise; BSIZE5 The total
number of the directors on the board; BINDP 5 The percentage of independent directors; DUAL 5 Coded 1
when the position of chairman and CEO are held by the same person, and 0 otherwise; MOWN 5 The
percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors; LNSIZE 5 Natural logarithm of market
capitalization; LEVGE5The ratio of total debt to total assets; Z-Score5Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a proxy for
financial distress; EP5 Earnings per share divided by stock price for the company; ROE5 Return on equity;
RETURN5 The total return index at the fiscal year end for period tminus total return index at the fiscal year
end for periodt-1 to total return index at the fiscal year end for periodt-1; POCN5 Coded 1 when the company is
politically connected, and 0 otherwise. Number of firms5 651. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the













Table 6 shows differences in means between restated and non-restated companies.
No significant differences between restated and non-restated companies are observed for
analysts’ stock recommendations (REC). With regard to control variables, we find a
significant mean difference for board size (BSIZE) and Z-Score between restated and
non-restated companies. For the remaining control variables, there are no significant mean
differences between restated and non-restated companies. However, the main weakness of
univariate analysis is that it examines only one variable at a time, and does not consider the
interaction of independent variables with each other in affecting the dependent variable
(Abdul Wahab and Rahman, 2009).
4.2 Correlation analysis
The correlation results are reported in Table 7. The results show a negative but insignificant
correlation between stock recommendations (REC) and financial restatements (RESTATE).
With regards to control variables, there is a positive and significant correlation between stock
recommendations (REC) and most of the control variables, namely, CEO duality (DUAL),
company size (LNSIZE), earnings to price ratio (EP), return on equity (ROE) and share return
(RETURN). In contrast, the results show negative and significant correlation between REC
and board independence (BINDP). However, it should be pointed out that a correlation
analysis does not consider the joint effect of all variables on REC. Therefore, regression
analysis is a better method to identify the determinants of REC, controlling for other
company-related variables. This is covered in the following section on regression results.
4.3 Regression results
The regression model is estimated using FGLS regression for panel data with panel-specific
heteroscedastic error structure to test our hypothesis. Table 8 presents the main regression
results of the relationship between sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations, financial
restatements and the control variables. Overall, as shown in Table 8, the model is significant
(p-value < 0.001; Wald Chi-square5 992.77). The highly significant results indicate that the
explanatory and control variables have a significant effect on sell-side analysts’ stock
recommendations. In addition, the last column of Table 8 shows the test for the existence of
multicollinearity via the variance inflation factor (VIF). From the Table, the results of VIF do
not show any multicollinearity problem in this study, as the VIF scores for all variables are
lower than 3, and far below the cut-off threshold of 10, as suggested by Hair et al. (2010) and
Kline (2011). The results inTable 8 demonstrate that financial restatements (RESTATE) have
a negative and significant coefficient at 5% (z 5 2.12, p 5 0.034).
Consistent with the hypothesis, the empirical results indicate that there is a negative and
significant relationship between financial restatements and sell-side analysts’ stock
recommendations. These results reveal that sell-side analysts tend to issue less favorable
stock recommendations for the companies with restated financial statements. Our findings
based on observations from an emerging economy complement the results of the US studies
by Griffin (2003), Palmrose et al. (2004), Young and Peng (2013) and Ye and Yu (2017) that
analysts revise their earnings forecasts or recommendations downwards or drop coverage
following financial restatements. Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013) also find a significant
downward revision in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts after financial restatements in
Canada. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that restatements signal higher
information uncertainty and negative financial reporting reputation, which detrimentally
influence analysts and investors in forming unfavorable judgements regarding restatement
firms, as reflected in downward earnings forecast revision and higher perceived risk of the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With respect to the control variables, the results in Table 8 indicate that board independence
(BINDP) has a negative and marginally significant coefficient at 10% (z 5 1.68, p-
value5 0.094). This result is justified based on independent directors’ lack of expertise and
knowledge of the company’s activities, which may result in the low company performance
(Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail, 2013). The results also indicate that CEO duality (DUAL) has a
positive and significant coefficient at 1% (z5 2.62, p-value5 0.009), suggesting that sell-side
analysts issue more favorable stock recommendations to companies with CEO duality. This
result is consistent with the argument in previous studies which claim that duality increases
company legitimacy and survival chances (Brown, 2012), and is significantly associated with
the amount of capital raised (Badru et al., 2017) and company performance (Hassoun and
Aloui, 2017).
Furthermore, managerial ownership (MOWN) has a positive and significant association
with sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations (REC) with a significance level of 10%
(z 5 1.79, p 5 0.073). This result is consistent with other studies which support the
shareholder alignment view of managerial ownership (Han et al., 2014; Liu, 2016, 2017). As
shown in Table 8, company size (LNSIZE) has a positive and significant coefficient at 1%
(z 5 3.55, p 5 < 0.001), which means that analysts issue optimistic recommendations for
larger companies, in line with Ioannou and Serafeim (2015).
Leverage (LEVGE) has a negative and significant association with sell-side analysts’
stock recommendations (REC) with a significance level of 1% (z 5 3.13, p 5 0.002),
Independent variables Predicted signs Coef. z p-value VIF
RESTATE − 0.062 2.12 0.034** 1.05
BSIZE ? 0.003 0.39 0.694 1.35
BINDP þ 0.200 1.68 0.094* 1.28
DUAL þ 0.124 2.62 0.009*** 1.12
MOWN þ 0.002 1.79 0.073* 1.19
LNSIZE þ 0.039 3.55 <0.001*** 2.04
LEVGE − 0.003 3.13 0.002*** 1.49
Z-Score þ 0.022 4.49 <0.001*** 1.69
EP þ 0.201 2.90 0.004*** 1.83
ROE þ 0.009 6.53 <0.001*** 2.18
RETURN þ 0.051 1.20 0.229 1.32
POCN − 0.052 1.71 0.087* 1.54
Constant ? 2.022 11.97 <0.001***
Time and Sector Dummies Yes
Number of Companies 246
Number of Observations 651
Wald Chi2 (23) 992.77
Prob > Chi2 <0.001***
Mean VIF 1.51
Note(s): This table provides coefficient estimates from the FGLS regression to estimate the nature of analyst
recommendation. RESTATE 5 Coded 1 if company restates financial statements, and 0 otherwise;
BSIZE5 The total number of the directors on the board; BINDP5 The percentage of independent directors;
DUAL 5 Coded 1 when the position of chairman and CEO are held by the same person, and 0 otherwise;
MOWN5 The percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors; LNSIZE5Natural logarithm
ofmarket capitalization; LEVGE5The ratio of total debt to total assets; Z-Score5Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a
proxy for financial distress; EP5Earnings per share divided by stock price for the company; ROE5Return on
equity; RETURN5The total return index at the fiscal year end for period tminus total return index at the fiscal
year end for periodt-1 to total return index at the fiscal year end for periodt-1; POCN 5 Coded 1 when the
company is politically connected, and 0 otherwise. Number of firms 5 651. ***, **, * indicate statistical








suggesting that analysts tend to issue less favorable recommendations for companies with
high leverage. Z-Score has negative and significant coefficient at 1% (z54.49, p5< 0.001),
whichmeans that analysts aremore likely to issue favorable recommendations for financially
distressed companies, which contradicts Clarke et al. (2006). Earnings to price ratio (EP) is
positively and significantly associated with the sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations
with a significance level of 1% (z5 2.90, p-value5 0.004). This indicates that companies with
higher EP gain more favorable stock recommendations, in tandem with the findings of
previous studies (Jegadeesh et al., 2004; Gu et al., 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015).
In terms of company profitability, ROE has a significantly positive relationship with
sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations with a significance level of 1% (z 5 6.53,
p-value 5 < 0.001). The finding also indicates that analysts issue more optimistic
recommendations for highly profitable companies, consistent with a number of empirical
studies (Gu et al., 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015). There is a negative and weakly
significant relationship between politically-connected companies (POCN) and
sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations with a significance level of 10% (z 5 1.71,
p-value 5 0.087), which suggests that analysts issue less favorable stock recommendations
for POCN. These results are consistent with the results of previous studies which find that
analysts face greater difficulties when estimating earnings for politically connected firms
(Chen et al., 2010) and their stock recommendations are less profitable for highly connected
firms (Alfonso, 2016). With regards to the other control variables board size (BSIZE) and
share return (RETURN), the results show no significant relationship between these variables
and sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations.
5. Robustness tests
5.1 Types of financial restatements
To confirm the result of the association between financial restatements and sell-side analysts’
stock recommendations, this study further examines the relationship between different types
of financial restatements and analysts’ stock recommendations. Following previous studies
such as Abdul Wahab et al. (2014) and Paterson and Valencia (2011), financial restatements
are categorized as misapplication of accounting rules (Restate_AR), accounting irregularities
(Restate_I) and misrepresentations/reclassifications (Restate_Mis).
As shown in Table 9 column (1), the model is highly significant (p-value < 0.001; Wald
Chi-square 5 830.84), similar to the results in the main analysis. The relationship between
restatements and analysts’ stock recommendations differs among the different types of
financial restatements. From the table, the results show no significant relationship between
Restate_AR and analysts’ stock recommendations. In contrast, the findings indicate negative
and significant relationship between Restate_I and Restate_Mis and analysts’ stock
recommendations (z 5 2.15, p 5 0.032) and (z 5 2.21, p 5 0.027) respectively. These
results also are supported when each of the three types of RESTATE are examined one at a
time rather than all three simultaneously as shown in the columns (2), (3), and (4). Overall, the
results are consistent with Hennes et al. (2008) who showed that the market reaction to
restatement announcements is more negative for financial statement irregularities than
errors (14% for irregularities and2% for errors). Table 9 also shows that the coefficients
of all other variables are similar to those in Table 8 (the main analysis).
5.2 Recommendation prior to release of restated financial statements
There is a possibility that analysts learned about potential restatements much earlier (before
discovering about them from the review of subsequent year annual report) based on their






(Brown et al., 2015; Iman and Spence, 2016) and accordingly factored this privileged
information in their recommendations prior to the issuance of annual report. To ascertain this
possibility, we also run an additional regression using the latest recommendation prior to the
release of the annual report containing restatements on prior year accounts as the dependent
variable. The findings are shown in Table 10. The main variable of interest RESTATE is not
significant which implies that analysts’ recommendations are not influenced by possible
leakage of information on restatements prior to the release of annual reports containing
disclosures on the companies restated prior year financial figures.
6. Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to examine the effect of financial restatements on the
sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations among Malaysian PLCs that have CBRS
exchange-sponsored analyst reports, by employing FGLS regression. In the extant
literature, only a few studies examine the analysts’ behavior around corrective disclosures
such as financial restatements, and they are mostly in developed markets. We advance the
Independent
variables
1 2 3 4
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Restate_AR 0.002 0.976 0.020 0.723
Restate_I 0.213 0.032** 0.197 0.044**
Restate_Mis 0.070 0.027** 0.063 0.042**
BSIZE 0.003 0.638 0.003 0.643 0.002 0.722 0.004 0.580
BINDP 0.198 0.099* 0.198 0.093* 0.208 0.078* 0.190 0.113
DUAL 0.116 0.016** 0.116 0.015** 0.118 0.012** 0.117 0.014**
MOWN 0.002 0.060* 0.002 0.057* 0.002 0.071* 0.002 0.050**
LNSIZE 0.040 <0.001*** 0.032 0.002*** 0.033 0.002*** 0.039 <0.001***
LEVGE 0.003 0.003*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.003 0.003***
Z-Score 0.022 <0.001*** 0.020 <0.001*** 0.020 <0.001*** 0.021 <0.001***
EP 0.204 0.003*** 0.195 0.004*** 0.192 0.005*** 0.206 0.002***
ROE 0.009 <0.001*** 0.009 <0.001*** 0.009 <0.001*** 0.009 <0.001***
RETURN 0.049 0.248 0.050 0.238 0.053 0.213 0.047 0.268
POCN 0.053 0.073* 0.040 0.189 0.042 0.165 0.051 0.086*
Constant 1.993 <0.001*** 2.035 <0.001*** 2.048 <0.001*** 1.994 <0.001***
Time and Sector
Dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of Companies 246 246 246 246
Observations 651 651 651 651
Wald Chi2 (23) 830.84 1948.13 2144.32 822.01
Prob > Chi2 <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001***
Note(s): This table provides coefficient estimates from the FGLS regression to estimate the nature of analyst
recommendation. Restate_AR5 Coded 1 when restatement is due to misapplication of accounting rules, and
0 otherwise; Restate_I 5 Coded 1 when restatement is due to accounting irregularities, and 0 otherwise,
Restate_MIS 5 Coded 1 when restatement is due to misrepresentations/reclassifications, and 0 otherwise;
BSIZE5 The total number of the directors on the board; BINDP5 The percentage of independent directors;
DUAL 5 Coded 1 when the position of chairman and CEO are held by the same person, and 0 otherwise;
MOWN5 The percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors; LNSIZE5Natural logarithm
ofmarket capitalization; LEVGE5The ratio of total debt to total assets; Z-Score5Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a
proxy for financial distress; EP5Earnings per share divided by stock price for the company; ROE5Return on
equity; RETURN5The total return index at the fiscal year end for period tminus total return index at the fiscal
year end for periodt-1 to total return index at the fiscal year end for periodt-1; POCN 5 Coded 1 when the
company is politically connected, and 0 otherwise. Number of firms 5 651. ***, **, * indicate statistical









research on the determinants of analysts’ recommendations by considering the effect of
financial restatements, which has hitherto been neglected in the extant literature. The
findings show that restatements are associated with less favorable stock recommendations
fromCBRS analysts, especially for irregularities andmisrepresentation/reclassification types
of restatements. Thus, we complement prior research on analysts’ behavior towards
restatement which shows that restatements bring detrimental effects in terms of reduced
analyst coverage and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, and recommendation
downgrades. In addition to the previously documented reactions, our study shows that
analysts evaluate the restatement implications and accordingly factor this into their
investment opinions. Therefore we contribute to the literature on the determinants of
analysts’ recommendations by highlighting the role of restatements in addition to factors
previously identified by previous researchers such as firm internationalization, strength of
corporate governance, corporate social responsibility activities, shareholder rights, earnings
risk and equity incentive plans (Autore, 2009; Yu, 2011; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015; Liu,
2017; Luo and Zhang, 2018; Peasnell et al., 2018).
These findings should be useful to capital market participants to understand how
analysts perceive and evaluate restated companies. The results are also useful to the
management and shareholders who are concerned with enhancing the credibility and quality
of financial reporting. In addition, the findings of this study have important implications
for regulatory bodies such as Bursa Malaysia and Securities Commission in respect of
their efforts to prevent and reduce the incidences of financial restatements among
Malaysian PLCs.
Independent variables Predicted signs Coef. z. p-value
RESTATE - 0.102 0.69 0.493
BSIZE ? 0.052 1.26 0.207
BINDP þ 0.304 0.45 0.653
DUAL þ 0.096 0.45 0.651
MOWN þ 0.002 0.50 0.619
LNSIZE þ 0.134 2.03 0.043**
LEVGE - 0.004 0.82 0.414
Z-Score þ 0.044 1.92 0.054*
EP þ 0.474 0.81 0.417
ROE þ 0.049 5.48 0.000***
RETURN þ 0.046 0.23 0.816
POCN - 0.103 0.56 0.577
Time and Sector Dummies Yes
Number of Companies 221
Number of Observations 570
Wald Chi2 (23) 113.45
Prob > Chi2 <0.001***
Note(s): This table provides coefficient estimates from the random effects ordered probit regression to
estimate the nature of analyst recommendation. RESTATE 5 Coded 1 if company restates financial
statements, and 0 otherwise; BSIZE5The total number of the directors on the board; BINDP5The percentage
of independent directors; DUAL 5 Coded 1 when the position of chairman and CEO are held by the same
person, and 0 otherwise; MOWN 5 The percentage of direct shares held by CEO and executive directors;
LNSIZE 5 Natural logarithm of market capitalization; LEVGE 5 The ratio of total debt to total assets; Z-
Score 5 Altman’s (1993) Z-score as a proxy for financial distress; EP 5 Earnings per share divided by stock
price for the company; ROE5 Return on equity; RETURN5 The total return index at the fiscal year end for
period tminus total return index at the fiscal year end for periodt-1 to total return index at the fiscal year end for
periodt-1; POCN5 Coded 1when the company is politically connected, and 0 otherwise. Number of firms5 651.












As in any research, this study has limitations that should be mentioned to ensure that the
findings are interpreted fairly. Malaysian companies are not required to make an immediate
announcement once they realize that prior financial statements have to be restated, unless the
restatements are forced by the Securities Commission. Analysts and other users of financial
statements discover the restatements only when they review the comparative financial
statements in the following year. In addition, no list of restated companies is available from
BursaMalaysia. Thus, wemay not capture fully the analysts’ reactions to restatement events.
Moreover, this study does not control for other confounding events that happen around the
release of annual reports containing the restatement disclosures. Further, this study focuses
on limited number of Malaysian companies that participated in the exchange-sponsored
CBRS research scheme, ignoring other non-exchange-sponsored analysts’ recommendations
as contained in the Thomson I/B/E/S and Bloomberg databases. Future studies may
capitalize on these comprehensive databases on analyst reports and examine the effect of
restatement on recommendation revisions (upgrade, downgrade and no change).
Notes
1. There are two types of financial analysts: sell-side and buy-side. Sell-side analysts work in equity
research departments of investment banks. They produce research reports which are available to the
investing public or their investing clients (i.e. fund managers, buy-side analysts). Buy-side analysts
work in fund management firms. They use information from sell-side analysts and elsewhere to
support portfolio investment decisions. Like sell-side analysts, they also write reports for their
employers which are private and confidential.
2. A mistake implies unintentional error, whereas irregularities do not. Irregularities may refer to
intentional misstatements as in the case of fraud.
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2013 Contract costs recognized of the Group includes
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construction of a public service infrastructure
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2008 In relation to the findings of the Investigative Audit
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